July 2014 • / 0
Abstract: Why do some politicians tolerate the violation of the law? In contexts where the poor are the primary violators of property laws, I argue that the answer lies in the electoral costs of enforcement: Enforcement can decrease support from poor voters even while it generates support among nonpoor voters. Read the rest of this entry »
Filed under: Ciencia Política
July 2014 • / 0
Abstract: We establish five facts about the informal economy in developing countries. First, it is huge, reaching about half of the total in the poorest countries. Second, it has extremely low productivity compared to the formal economy: informal firms are typically small, inefficient, and run by poorly educated entrepreneurs. Read the rest of this entry »
Filed under: Ciencia Política, Derecho, Economía
July 2014 • / 0
Abstract: Political institutions strongly influence incentives to tax. In this article, I examine differences across national regimes in provincial taxation in Argentina from 1959–2001 and compare them to sub-national regimes under national democracy. Read the rest of this entry »
Filed under: Ciencia Política, Economía
Liberty Review América Latina 